How Singapore Is Building Nuclear Energy Expertise — And Why It Has Not Decided Anything Yet

What is Singapore actually doing with nuclear energy right now?

Singapore has not decided to build a nuclear power plant. That point bears stating clearly at the outset, because the flurry of institutional activity over the past year — new government divisions, a wave of specialist hiring, expanded research pipelines — can easily be misread as preparation for a foregone conclusion. It is not. What Singapore is doing is more deliberate, and in some ways more interesting: it is building the institutional capacity to make an informed decision, rather than rushing toward one.

The immediate catalyst is a scheduled review by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2027. Known formally as the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) Phase 1 Mission, the assessment was announced in May and will evaluate whether Singapore has developed the capabilities necessary to evaluate nuclear deployment responsibly. Preparing for that review is driving much of what is currently visible.

Which government bodies have been restructured, and what does that signal?

Two significant institutional moves occurred in quick succession. In April, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) established a dedicated Nuclear Energy Division to shape policy and coordinate the various agencies involved. Then in June, the Energy Market Authority (EMA) carved a new Nuclear Development Department out of its existing Nuclear Energy Office, with a mandate to study the practical requirements of running nuclear projects — financing structures, project management, procurement.

These are not cosmetic reorganisations. Separating policy coordination from operational development reflects an understanding that nuclear infrastructure requires distinct institutional competencies that cannot be housed comfortably in a single unit. The EMA and the National Environment Agency (NEA) are also actively recruiting: checks found at least twelve nuclear-related job openings advertised over the past three months, covering roles from advanced reactor concepts to nuclear materials security.

Ian Grant, an independent expert who has advised the IAEA and governments including Singapore, the Philippines and Estonia on nuclear infrastructure, reads these moves as consistent with a country conducting due diligence rather than committing to a path. “There’s no doubt that these additional personnel are being brought in to support the current work toward making an assessment of whether to proceed,” he told CNA. Singapore is also drawing on external consultants for some of the specialised skills required — a pragmatic approach, Grant notes, though he stresses that internal capability remains essential regardless of what the eventual decision turns out to be.

How is research and training capacity being expanded?

The Singapore Nuclear Research and Safety Institute (SNRSI), based at the National University of Singapore, sits at the centre of the knowledge-building effort. Its CEO, Low Xin Wei, describes growing demand from both government agencies and industry for nuclear-related expertise. A recent paid SNRSI course on nuclear issues drew around eighty participants from government, industry and the wider region — a cohort that included senior executives alongside officers from MTI, the Ministry of Sustainability and the Environment, EMA and NEA.

The more consequential development is structural. SNRSI is working with NUS to launch Singapore’s first master’s programme in nuclear engineering, a one-year course expected to begin in the 2027 academic year with approximately thirty full-time and part-time students. Low describes the institute’s course offerings as highly bespoke, calibrated directly to the manpower needs articulated by government agencies and industry partners. Over the past decade, SNRSI has recruited more than thirty PhD-level researchers through its scholarship and training pipelines, covering nuclear reactor science, radiation safety, nuclear materials and waste management. The institute plans to grow its researcher pool from roughly sixty to more than one hundred by 2030.

The scale of this investment is notable. Training pipelines of this kind operate on decade-long horizons — which means Singapore is making commitments now that will shape its options well into the 2030s, irrespective of what the 2027 IAEA review concludes.

Does this expertise have value even if Singapore never builds a reactor?

Low argues explicitly that it does. As Singapore’s neighbours — Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand — advance their own nuclear energy programmes with varying degrees of seriousness, capabilities in reactor safety, dispersion modelling, radiochemistry and radiobiology carry direct strategic relevance. Understanding the plants being developed across the region, and preparing for regional emergency scenarios, requires exactly the kind of technical depth Singapore is now cultivating.

SNRSI has been expanding its international partnerships accordingly. At the IAEA General Conference in September, the institute signed agreements with the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology, adding to existing partnerships with organisations in France, the United States and China. These arrangements give SNRSI access to overseas expertise, research reactors, specialised facilities and simulators — assets Singapore cannot yet replicate domestically.

If Singapore does decide to proceed, how far away is actual electricity generation?

Further than most headlines imply. Grant is measured on this point: even a positive decision following the 2027 review would trigger years of additional preparatory work before construction could begin. Legal frameworks would need to be established, regulatory infrastructure built out, specialist hiring scaled up substantially, and financing arrangements put in place. Construction itself would then add further years before any electricity reached the grid.

“This is a long-term effort, and we’re at the beginning phase,” Grant said.

That framing is worth holding onto. What Singapore is doing right now is not building a nuclear power plant. It is building the institutional architecture — the regulatory knowledge, the trained personnel, the research depth, the international relationships — that would make a credible decision possible. Whether that decision eventually comes, and what it looks like, remains genuinely open. The sophistication lies precisely in keeping it that way.